Under which conditions does public participation really advance sustainability goals? Findings of a Meta-Analysis of stakeholder involvement in environmental Decision-making by Fritsch, O. & Newig, J.
Under Which Conditions Does Public Participation
Really Advance Sustainability Goals?
Findings of a Meta-Analysis of Stakeholder Involvement
in Environmental Decision-making
Paper prepared for the conference
‘Earth System Governance: Theories and Strategies for Sustainability’
2007 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions
of Global Environmental Change
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 24 - 26 May 2007
Oliver Fritsch & Dr. Jens Newig
Institute of Environmental Systems Research
University of Osnabrück / Germany
- 2 -
1. Public participation and sustainability – a paradox?
Environmental governance on both sides of the Atlantic inreasingly relies on the participation
of non-state actors such as citizens and organized interest groups. Prompted by the U.S.
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 and the Rio Declaration of 1992, which demands in
principle 10 that “environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all
concerned citizens”, followed by the Århus Convention of 1998, four recent European Union
directives1 have legally institutionalized access to information and public participation in
environmental decisions.
Among the motives and rationales for public participation, which have traditionally centered
around emancipatory and legitimacy aspects, it is now an increased effectiveness of govern-
ance that is being discussed – and aimed at (Heinelt 2002; Beierle and Cayford 2002; Newig
2005; Koontz and Thomas 2006). In the face of continuing implementation deficits of envi-
ronmental policy (Knill and Lenschow 2000) and increasingly complex societal structures,
participatory decision modes that are suited to foster collective learning are indeed regarded
as a prerequisite for the advancement of sustainable policies (Dryzek 1997). Focusing on sub-
stantive outcomes rather than on fairness or other aspects, participation thus becomes a means
to achieve environmental goals in a more targeted, swift and effective way (Bulkeley and Mol
2003). Symptomatic is the claim of the guidance document on public participation relative to
the EC Water Framework Directive that “public participation is not an end in itself but a tool
to achieve the environmental objectives of the Water Framework Directive” (EU 2002: 6).
Specifically, participatory governance relies on the expectation that participation improves the
‘quality’ of decisions by incorporating the knowledge of local actors (Steele 2001; Pellizzoni
2003; Yearley et al. 2003). Moreover, it is expected that the involvement of non-state actors
leads to a higher acceptance of decisions and thus improves implementation and compliance
(Thomas 1995). Both mechanisms are assumed to ultimately lead to better environmental out-
comes as opposed to more hierarchical modes of steering (Newig forthcoming).
However, this ‘instrumental claim’ has not remained undisputed. Scholars have pointed out
multiple dangers and trade-offs which Dahl (Dahl 1994) has termed a ‘democratic dilemma’
between effectiveness and participation. From a rational choice perspective, the collective use
of resources regularly implies social dilemma situations (Hardin 1968), which call for institu-
tional arrangements on scales large enough to internalize the negative externalities. Participa-
tory decision-making, however, is typically located on local or regional scales, and, contrary
to sustainability goals, the interests of local actors tend to focus on shorter time horizons.
Who is ‘right’ – those who purport that participation supports environmentally favorable deci-
sions, or those who claim the opposite? The crucial question becomes whether this claim –
that participatory modes of implementation actually improve substantive policy outcomes –
actually holds. Or, more specifically, to what extent and under what circumstances it holds.
Even if one does not embrace the notion of participation as the “new tyranny” (Cooke and
Kothari 2001), “there is something of a dilemma if participation turns out, empirically, not to
improve outcomes” (Lee and Abbot 2003: 87-8).
Although the whole field of participation research has now reached a welcome degree of dif-
ferentiation and variety, the issue of the ecological outcomes of participatory governance has
received surprisingly little attention (Beierle and Cayford 2002; Koontz and Thomas 2006).
1 These are the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), the Strategic Environmental Assessment Direc-
tive (2001/42/EC), the new Environmental Information Directive (RL 2003/4/EC) and the Public Partici-
pation Directive (2003/35/EC).
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Accordingly, the empirical basis is still weak and, above all, fragmented (see Diduck and Sin-
clair 2002; Beierle and Cayford 2002). To our knowledge, there is not a single study in Eng-
lish or German that systematically addresses this question. Moreover, systematic conception-
alisations of relevant causal mechanisms are also lacking. Although a considerable body of
empirical and theoretical knowledge exists, this lies scattered throughout a large number of
single (case) studies, most of which – if at all – only touch upon aspects of outcome effective-
ness; the underlying mechanisms are often only implicitly assumed. Thus, Beierle and Cay-
ford in their seminal study on public participation demand that
”[...] more research on implementation is needed. The value of public participation
will ultimately be judged by its ability to enhance implementation and show demon-
strable benefits for environmental quality. Understanding the links between participa-
tion and actions on the ground is a high priority. Research should focus on the spe-
cific links between public participation and the political, legal, and social forces that
drive implementation forward“ (Beierle and Cayford 2002: 76).
The aim of this paper is to conceptualise the instrumental claim on the basis of a causal model
and to present the preliminary results of an empirical test. We will proceed as follows: In sec-
tion 2, the existing knowledge on mechanisms is integrated into a causal model containing
hypotheses as to why and how and which participatory processes (are expected to) lead to bet-
ter implementation of decisions and better environmental outcomes. This is to serve as a con-
ceptual framework for further qualitative and semi-quantitative analysis. Section 3 presents
the initial results of a comprehensive meta-analysis of existing case studies. The final section
is devoted to our conclusions.
2. Conceptual framework:
How participation can improve regulation
If we are to understand whether and how public participation enhances the output legitimacy
of decisions in terms of the effectiveness of policy implementation, we need hypotheses on
causal mechanisms against which we can compare empirical findings. This section attempts
to integrate existing hypotheses and causal assumptions from the literature on public partici-
pation and on policy implementation in a generic model2:
Its general structure is based on the assumption that the substantive outcomes of a decision
depend on the type of decision process (and how it is carried out) which, in turn, happens
within, and is influenced by, the societal context. Ultimately, the substantive outcomes of a
decision process – changes in environmental quality but also in the social system – feed back
to the context. Thus, the outcomes of one process may affect the context of future decisions.
2 A more complete version of this model is outlined in Newig submitted.
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2.1 Concepts and terminology
Naturally, the ‘instrumental claim’ only applies to a subset of all possible and existing forms
of public engagement. We exclude all those forms of civic engagement that do not aim at col-
lective decisions, such as Agenda 21 processes, as well as participation in votes or plebiscites
(which are democratic routine mechanisms). Moreover, the analysis shall be restricted to
those forms of public participation that are situated at a sufficiently regional or local level
such that non-organised citizens still have a fair opportunity to participate (cases that are
comparable to public participation envisaged by the EU). Public participation thus ranges
from public consultation by competent authorities to cooperative decision-making, including
different forms such as public hearings, consensus conferences, regional forums, councils,
citizens’ juries or stakeholder platforms, to name but a few (see Rowe and Frewer 2005).
With its focus on effective policy implementation, the conceptual stance of our model follows
the traditional heuristics of implementation research in the sense of policy design –
implementation – impact, as has been known since the 1970s (see, e.g. Pressman and
Wildavsky 1984) and thus ultimately follows a top-down approach (Hill and Hupe 2002).
This may be surprising at first sight, since participation research focuses precisely on those
forms of decision-making that differ from the traditional authoritative mode. However, given
that effective policy implementation constitutes the goal and the yardstick for (successful) par-
ticipatory processes, the direction of the analysis can only be from the decision of a state
authority (which may or may not involve non-state actors) to the implementation and compli-
ance by the legal addressees.
Public participation can have a twofold impact on effective policy delivery. The first is that it
influences the decision itself (otherwise it would not be participation). By incorporating envi-
ronmental values, participation can lead to environmentally ‘better’ decisions (section 2.2).
The second is that participation can lead to a more complete implementation of decisions
(section 2.3). Furthermore, we will also touch upon the influence of the process characteristics
and of the societal and environmental context in which a decision process is situated (sections
2.4 and 2.5).
2.2 Mechanisms I:
‘Better’ decisions through participation?
It is claimed that participation enhances the quality of decisions. The main mechanism that
can be assumed is that, in the course of the participatory process, information is generated or
made available that would not have been so otherwise, and that, further, the decision profits
from this information, i.e. the information is actually incorporated into the decision. Thus, it
seems plausible that environmental decisions can profit from the factual knowledge of actors
involved about their (local) conditions (López Cerezo and González García 1996; Pellizzoni
2003), assuming that those who are closest to a problem develop the best understanding of it
(Steele 2001). Other authors, however, contest this claim and hold that it is rather the authori-
ties who have different and usually more reliable means of information provision at their dis-
posal, especially regarding highly technical issues and the corresponding need for specialised
expert knowledge (Munnichs 2004).
Then again, there may be information that ‘emerges’ from the close interaction of actors in a
group process. Many authors stress the positive effects of social learning, the plurality of per-
spectives and thus the more creative decision-making as characteristics of participatory deci-
sion-making (Doak 1998). Yet group processes also have the potential to create adverse ef-
fects. For instance, Cooke 2001 points out problematic findings from social psychology re-
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garding consensus-oriented group processes, such as the tendency towards taking risky deci-
sions or an immunisation towards independent and critical arguments. Which of these mecha-
nisms prevails in a given context seems to be unclear at present.
Another type of information from which decisions could profit is information regarding the
extent to which planned measures will be accepted by the addressees. In this respect, partici-
pation becomes an “instrument for the anticipation of resistance to planning and implementa-
tion” (Linder and Vatter 1996, 181).
2.3 Mechanisms II:
Better implementation through participation?
Generally, participation is expected to prevent implementation problems from occurring
(Bulkeley and Mol 2003). Quite plausibly, the addressees of a decision must know of it in or-
der to be able to implement it – obey rules, comply with requirements. If future addressees are
involved in decision-making, they can be assumed to be thoroughly informed about these de-
cisions, and a higher rate of compliance can reasonably be expected, as the possibly necessary
measures of reorganisation and adaptation to new (regulatory) conditions, which usually take
some time, can duly be taken. Furthermore, compliance with a decision is expected to depend
positively on the degree of acceptance, or even identification, on the part of the addressees
(see, e.g. Webler and Renn 1995).
Acceptance may, firstly, be supported by providing the interested actors with early and com-
prehensive information. This may prevent actors from feeling left out or ignored and create a
sense of involvement and belonging. Moreover, an intensive involvement of the concerned
actors in a decision process that is perceived as fair and based on mutual communication is
expected to enhance the acceptance of the decision. This even holds when the result does not
correspond to the actors’ expectations (Creighton 1981), as procedural justice research has
found that the acceptance of a decision crucially depends on aspects of fairness of the deci-
sion procedure (Lind and Tyler 1988). Furthermore, a decision that involves conflicting inter-
ests is more likely to be accepted by the different parties if it is based on either a consensus or
at least a compromise to which most of the parties agree. This in turn most likely requires an
intensive participatory process that allows the concerned actors to effectively claim their
stakes, but also a spectrum of interests that does not fundamentally rule out any consensual
solutions.
Furthermore, in the medium and long term, the building of trust relationships both among the
non-state actors involved and between non-state and state actors through participation
(Bulkeley and Mol 2003) can lead to an increased regional collective social capital and can
thus influence the context of future decision processes. In particular, the building of trust can
improve acceptance of and thus the willingness to comply with measures, as empirical studies
in other contexts have shown (Murphy 2004).
2.4 Mechanisms III:
Importance of process design and characteristics
The choice of the process type and design basically determines whether, for instance, a mere
road show, a public hearing, or a forum with large possibilities for public involvement (such
as a citizens’ jury) is to be carried out and thus largely influences both actual participation and
intervention of non-state actors as well as the mutual information flows (Rowe and Frewer
2005). Moreover, the process design plays an important part in securing the fairness of the
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procedure, as measured, e.g. by a fair representation of all concerned actors or equal opportu-
nities for all participants to voice their concerns (Webler 1995). ‘Success criteria’ that are fre-
quently mentioned in the literature include the transparency of the process, open communica-
tion, early involvement, joint determination of process rules and the impartiality of the mod-
eration. A basic premise for all the aforementioned criteria is, of course, that there is sufficient
openness regarding the decision to be made. If, on the other hand, the participants get the im-
pression that decisions have already been taken (‘foregone conclusions’), then the motivation
to participate and, ultimately, acceptance of the decision, is expected to remain rather poor
(Diduck and Sinclair 2002).
2.5 Mechanisms IV:
Importance of the context
Research has been suggesting that the context of environmental decision processes plays a
decisive role for both the output and the substantive outcomes. Some key factors (others are
possible) are mentioned in the following.
Naturally, a participatory process can only be legitimate and successful as to its outcomes if
those non-state actors who have a stake in the issue actually participate. The tendency to par-
ticipate – and thus to invest time and other resources – is primarily a function of the degree to
which an actor perceives a problem to touch his own interests, combined with the perceived
chances to influence the output of the decision process and to expect a clear benefit from it.
However, a lack of participation does not necessarily imply disinterest: rather, actors may feel
that their interests and concerns are already sufficiently represented in the process (Diduck
and Sinclair 2002). On the other hand, the non-participation of certain groups can also reflect
their estimation to better achieve their interests outside of state-run participatory processes,
such as Whelan and Lyons 2005 have shown for environmental activists.
The results of participatory decision-making also crucially depend on the interests and con-
cerns of the actors involved. This implies that if the majority of the participants favour a less
‘environmental’ decision, the decision is likely to be shaped in this way. Even financial com-
pensation and a fair decision process may not, in severe cases, lead to a decision being ac-
cepted by those immediately concerned.
The extent to which a decision is shaped by particular actors depends of course on their power
position, i.e. their resources (Lee and Abbot 2003). Moreover, a higher degree of participation
is more likely with dominant, influential and financially strong actors and those with a high
degree of other resources, including individual social capital. Processes with strong power
asymmetries among the participants may therefore risk suppressing the interests of weaker ac-
tors more than would be the case in an authoritative decision (see, e.g. Hilp 2003).
Finally, the structure of a problem can have a decisive influence on the success of a participa-
tory decision process. While a complex and intricate issue may be difficult to comprehend for
some actors and increase asymmetrical information (Kartez and Bowman 1993; Diduck and
Sinclair 2002), a decision process involving open deliberation can open up possibilities for
win-win situations and more creative, and ultimately more effective, solutions. Moreover, the
design and potential ‘success’ of a participatory decision process is most likely to crucially
depend on the existence of possible solutions – be they of a technical, organisational or legal
nature, including the financial and other costs involved in their realisation. If these do not ex-
ist, a consensual conflict resolution in the case of conflicting interests will hardly be achiev-
able.
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3. Preliminary results of the secondary case study analysis
In this chapter, we present preliminary results of an ongoing empirical analysis. The aim is to
put the approaches discussed above to an empirical test. Facing the alternative of conducting
our own case studies or of drawing on the extensive set of studies that already exists in the lit-
erature, we chose the second option for a comprehensive meta-analysis. For in spite of many
commonalities, there is a wide range of differences in both context settings and ways of in-
volving citizens in participatory decision-making. Consequently, we believe that only the
analysis of a large number of cases will give us a reliable insight into the factors determining
outcome effectiveness and into the interdependencies between different factors. Attaining
such a large number of cases is far easier when drawing on existing case studies, which have
not yet been systematically analysed and compared.
3.1 Methodology and case studies
Methodologically, we rely on qualitative and quantitative instruments of case study meta-
analysis (Lucas 1974; Larsson 1993). By way of a comprehensive literature review, we identi-
fied more than 200 in-depth case studies of deliberative governance focussing on environ-
mental decision-making that have been conducted over the past 20 years in Northern America
and Europe. A subset of 120 studies forms the final case study pool, while the remaining case
studies will be selectively consulted for specific factors of interest.
The case study pool is characterised by a predominance of public participation processes con-
ducted in the United States, making up almost 60 percent of all case studies. This reflects the
popularity of public participation approaches, mediation and negotiated rule-making in US
environmental politics over the last 30 years. The remaining cases describe environmental de-
liberations in EU member states. The smaller number of public participation events in the EU
can be explained by a less ‘experimental’ public administration and a more rigid application
of constitutional laws and decision-making rules. Due to its recency only a fistful of cases
analysed in this paper have really been motivated by current EU regulation on public partici-
pation. As a consequence, we primarily analysed decisions made in the EU before the ‘par-
ticipatory turn’ as well in the US and argue by way of analogy.
For the purpose of this paper, we selected and analysed 47 cases chosen from the case study
pool that reflect the plurality and multi-facetedness of participatory environmental govern-
ance. The cases represent various geographic regions and political scales and different fields
of environmental policy, e.g. waste policy, energy policy, water policy, or natural resource
management. Furthermore, the cases comprise varying intensities of participation, duration
and problem complexity. For an overview, see the Annex at the end of this paper.
Due to space constraints, we do not intend to present and discuss these cases in detail. Rather,
drawing on a detailed analysis of these 47 cases, we attempt to ascertain the extent to which
public participation in environmental decision-making brings about ecologically valuable pol-
icy outputs, enhances policy implementation and, consequently, increases the ecological out-
come.
For the purpose of this paper, we found it useful to differentiate between three types of situa-
tions in which public participation was applied. As citizen deliberation can always be mir-
rored against a hypothetic top-down process (non-participatory regulation), we suggest to dif-
ferentiate between public deliberations with a) policy-setting, b) policy implementation and c)
conflict resolution characteristics. We argue that these three types of public participation are
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set in quite different policy contexts with implications for the involved actors, the problem to
be discussed and the conflict to be dealt with.
Public participation in a policy-setting context is about finding out the general direction of the
policy. As a consequence, there is disagreement about the actual problem and whether there is
need to take action. Public participation exercises defined as policy-setting may also be pur-
sued by administrative bodies. The classification is not about leading actors or policy levels
involved, but about the logic of the process: Policy-setting public participation means open-
process decision-making without pre-defined substantial goals or limits. This may include the
development of a management plan for a natural resource by a state agency (below the legis-
lative level) as long as the management process itself is not guided by pre-defined goals, but
pursued in order to develop those goals in the light of public interest. These processes more
often than not take place at the regional or local level.
Public participation in a policy-implementation context means the involvement of civil society
actors or business interests during the implementation of a political decision ‘on the ground’.
The primary decision on what the problem is about and what the general goal is, has already
been made by a superior legislative body. Yet, there is a desire to involve the public in order
to communicate agency actions as well as to find out how to apply the rule in a particular po-
litical and social context and how to best attain the given goal.
While it is a general rationale of public participation to reduce litigation, there are certain
cases, termed mediation, which are of a genuine juridical character in the sense that public
participation replaces a law suit as the traditional top-down procedure for such conflicts.
These include, on the one hand, conflicts between multiple state actors and civil society actors
with controversial jurisdictions and accountabilities or conflicts between several civil society
actors on the other. As the goal of mediations is the resolution of conflicts among stake-
holders, the predominant logic in those processes is not concerned with the public interest.
Nevertheless, we can analyse the cases regarding their differential environmental outputs and
outcomes.
3.2 Implementation quality
In the previous chapter we introduced several accounts of why deliberative policy-making is
expected to enhance implementation. Our analysis confirmed the widely held view that public
participation improves the implementation of policy measures. In 24 out of 47 cases, the final
agreement has been implemented more completely and swifter as compared to top-down ap-
proaches, whereas 13 cases report a lower implementation effectiveness.
Implementation quality: Higher No difference Lower No information
Policy-setting cases 10 4 6 1
Policy implementation cases 3 1 5 2
Conflict resolution cases 11 1 2 1
Total 24 6 13 4
Looking into these cases, we find that improving acceptance does in fact increase compliance
and, as a result, implementation. Although we do not want to rule out the procedural justice
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hypothesis, the case studies suggested that a general satisfaction with the substance of the
agreement forms the basis that explains compliance.
The 301(h) case, one of the cases in which participation did not enhance implementation,
highlights the importance of the substantial agreement of all parties to the final decision in or-
der to avoid litigation. This federal law regulated the discharge of wastewater into the sea and
was regarded as a highly demanding piece of rulemaking from an environmentalist point of
view. Yet shortly after Congress passed the law, US EPA was directed to renegotiate the law
with selected stakeholders from public agencies at the state level and with business interests
who opposed the law as being too strict and costly. Environmental NGOs were invited to join
in the talks but refused to participate, as they rightfully expected that the negotiation would
simply water down Congress’ version of the law. After the agreement was settled, they chose
to file suit. While they were unsuccessful in re-installing Congress’ version of the law, the
court ordered a compromise that, in most respects, was closer to the original law than to the
negotiated agreement (Burgess et al. 1983).
The conflict resolution cases provide a further reason why public participation increases im-
plementation effectiveness by reducing litigation. One third of the conflict resolution cases,
all of them in the US, report legally binding pre-negotiation agreements that specifically pro-
hibit post-negotiation law suits against the agreements to be made. While this theoretically
does not rule out legal actions by non-participating third parties, in practice these self-
commitments turned out to be very effective.
The implementation of policy decisions made prior to the involvement process looks consid-
erably worse than the policy-setting or conflict resolution cases. Five out of nine cases report
a weaker implementation or even non-implementation (failed process). The main reason
seems to be that opponents of the overall goal shy away from participating at all and rely on
the legal process to stop the project.
3.3 Output quality
Referring to output quality, many authors have argued that extending the knowledge base as
well as social learning processes and discursive communication will have a positive impact,
yet they have failed to substantiate the claim. According to our research, this position does not
necessarily prove correct. More specifically, it appears to be very much dependent on the par-
ticular definition of ‘quality’. As long as quality criteria are that the decision is, one the one
hand, based on a broad and well-balanced set of facts and values and, on the other, is the
product of a truly critical discourse, we will not dispute this claim.
However, the picture looks different if we define ‘quality’ by the decision’s substantive con-
tent. As we have argued above, current EU regulation expects an improvement of environ-
mental output quality, i.e. expects these policy decisions to be more ecologically beneficial
than classic modes of regulation. Based on our preliminary analysis of 47 cases, this expecta-
tion is not justified. Instead, we find that policy makers tend to face a loss of ecological qual-
ity when establishing participatory modes of governance. 18 out of 47 case studies report a
lower ecological quality of decision, and authors of 13 case studies identify no change in
quality. Only ten case studies provide evidence that deliberative regulation increases policy-
goal attainment.
The inclusion or exclusion of actors, their ideological background and preferences appear to
be the most influential factors on the output of participatory regulation in environmental poli-
tics. In contrast, both procedural features such as transparency or fairness and contextual vari-
ables such as problem complexity or public attention only show a limited impact. According
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to the case studies, conservationists were rarely discriminated against to a significant extent.
They often had a say in the matter, but this does not necessarily mean that their opinions were
listened to. Rather, environmentalist positions in public participation cannot claim to repre-
sent majority positions but instead have to compete with social and economic actors.
Output quality: Higher No difference Lower No information
Policy-setting cases 6 5 8 2
Policy implementation cases 1 6 1 3
Conflict resolution cases 3 2 9 1
Total 10 13 18 6
This is important in two respects: On the one hand, deliberation in public participation deci-
sions involves finding a compromise between different positions rather than convincing each
other that a particular position is better or more morally justified than another. As a conse-
quence, ‘good green arguments’ often do not predominate in public deliberations but are just
one position being discussed around the table. On the other hand, only very few decisions are
on purely ecological issues. The overwhelming majority of cases also had social and eco-
nomic dimensions in addition to the ecological aspect, whereby the term ‘social’ could com-
prise a large number of conflictive issues such as racial-ethnic questions, cultural divides and
socio-political issues of interest. The consequence is that the options available to reach a deci-
sion did indeed have an ecological impact, but the decisions were not made on purely eco-
logical grounds. That is, environmentalist positions have to compromise with competing
world views preventing high standards of environmental quality.
In particular, this is observable when environmental agencies, such as the US EPA, initiated
‘policy-setting’ public participation processes. Their ambitious ecological approach is regu-
larly watered down by participants who neither share the agency’s environmental awareness
nor the will for rigorous implementation of ecological measures. The study on the 301(h) law
discussed above is a case in point. The EPA defends a high-end ecological position but has to
compromise with business interests or competing public agencies, whereby the participatory
process was not designed for increasing the ecological quality of the rule. Rather, the overall
motive of the public participation process was to water down the governmental federal rule
and the only key question was to what extent non-state actors would succeed in doing so
(Burgess et al. 1983). A similar observation can be made in environmental mediations that
seem to be initiated as replacements of litigation. The overall logic of the decision-making
process here is not to reach a high-quality policy goal, but to resolve a socio-political conflict.
As a consequence, compromising is the road to success although, from an environmentalist
perspective, lawsuits (as usual top-down way) are more promising for better outputs.
This line of reasoning cannot, of course, be applied to public participation exercises which we
characterised as policy-implementing in the sense that a decision has already been made. As
the policy goals are already fixed to a large extent, they are not up to deliberation anymore
and cannot be watered down. Public involvement is expected to support the local implementa-
tion of decisions by providing local knowledge. However, in only one of eleven public par-
ticipation processes in a policy-implementation setting, an improvement of policy can be ob-
served. As outlined in the previous chapter, a high number of processes fail due to the fact
that participants either want to decide on more than locally revelant details or oppose the pre-
defined goals from the outset. The analysis reveals that involvement is considered far less
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relevant to potential participants: While in the view of supporters of a pre-defined decision
there is no need to get involved as their interests are well represented, opponents shy away
from participating as they cannot change the direction anymore. While this is up to future case
study-based research, we hypothesise that a pre-defined goal might be a serious obstacle for
improving agency decisions through public participation.
Admittedly, only one of the policy-implementing cases report a worse policy output. More
than half of the cases discuss neither improvements nor changes to the worse. That is, the out-
put does not seem to be affected at all. While several deliberative processes are widely re-
garded as purely environmental decisions, we observed that the political issue under discus-
sion indeed has ecological consequences, but the options themselves are equal with regard to
their environmental impact. Many such cases describe siting decisions, i.e. public involve-
ment processes in which unpopular major projects such as power plants, toxic waste sites or
industrial areas are discussed. In such situations citizens often debate on compensation, job
programmes or social benefits rather than the aspect of ‘where’ (do we prefer location a, b or
c?) or even ‘whether at all’. While the latter questions have an ecological dimension, the for-
mer definitely do not. As a consequence, the decisions were instead made on social or eco-
nomic grounds. This makes it difficult to assess whether the expectations of environmental
improvements put forward by advocates of public participation are justified. After all, this di-
lemma would even occur in a classic top-down process with equally indifferent options.
3.4 Consequences: Environmental Outcomes
While the insights of implementation research and administrative studies have shown that tra-
ditional environmental policy was doomed to failure because of compliance deficits and a
lack of implementation, only few would claim that the policy output itself was inappropriate
in respect to the performance objective. Implementation failed due to the resistance of societal
actors who refused political compliance or reacted by way of litigation. As a result, when the
outcome of a political decision is a product of output quality and implementation effective-
ness, top-down approaches failed due to the implementation factor.
Following on from our above claim, we argue that environmental participatory governance
only conditionally promises a way out. Such modes of governance might significantly en-
hance implementation, yet face limitations regarding the ecological quality of the policy out-
put. Assuming that output quality and implementation effectiveness determine outcome effec-
tiveness, we argue that participatory decision-making fails with regard to the ‘output’.
Our preliminary findings suggest that there is a trade-off between environmental output qual-
ity and policy implementation: One gains one thing but loses the other – the claim of a tension
between democracy (participation) and effectiveness so often discussed in public policy
seems to hold for participation research as well.
Yet, to conclude that participation research is wrong in claiming that citizens’ involvement
might produce far more effective outcomes than classic regulatory approaches would be an
error in reasoning. Rather, we argue that collaborative environmental governance tends to be
superior to top-down approaches, because in an outcome-oriented perspective the implemen-




Will environmental governance improve through the employment of public participation in
policy implementation? Will it, more specifically, thus achieve improved substantive policy
outcomes as the dominant rationale in current international and EU environmental regulation
suggests? In this paper, we have sought to contribute to responding to these questions in two
ways.
First, we have sketched a conceptual framework for analysis, drawing on and integrating ex-
isting hypotheses on causal relations. Taking on a ‘classical’ stance of implementation re-
search, we have identified four major areas of influence: by incorporating relevant local in-
formation and environmental values, participation can lead to environmentally ‘better’ deci-
sions. Most importantly, participation can lead to an improved implementation of decisions by
fostering acceptance and conflict resolution. Furthermore, process characteristics and the so-
cietal and environmental context in which a decision process is situated largely influence the
potential success of a participatory decision process with respect to improved substantive pol-
icy outcomes.
Second, we undertook – by way of analogy – a preliminary examination of the above proposi-
tions by systematically reviewing 47 cases (chosen from a larger pool of case studies) that re-
flect the plurality and multi-facetedness of participatory environmental governance, represent-
ing various geographic regions and political scales and different fields of environmental pol-
icy, and varying intensities of participation, duration and problem complexity. With respect to
our main hypotheses, we found a divided result that expresses a trade-off: on the one hand,
the ‘quality’ of decisions with respect to more environmentally sound outputs was rather less-
ened than improved through participation. On the other hand, participation did indeed foster
the effective implementation of these decisions.
Much is left to be done. While in our own project, the in-depth analysis of several dozen case
studies and their systematic semi-quantitative analysis is yet to be undertaken, we invite re-
searchers in the field to join us in our effort to better understand the impact that participatory
regulation has and will have on enhancing substantive policy outcomes.
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Annex: case studies analysed
Case Policy field Country Type3 Reference
301(h) Water management USA S Burgess et al. 1983
Aargau Waste management Switzerland I Renn et al. 1998
Albemarle-Pamlico
Estuarine Study
Water management USA S Koontz et al. 2004
Berlin-Brandenburg Airport siting Germany I Barbian and Zilleßen 1997;





USA C Burgess and Smith 1983
Brown Company Air-pollution man-
agement





UK S Mills et al. 1993
Chesapeake Bay Water management USA S Meyers et al. 1995; Randolph
and Kerns 1997
Chiwaukee Prairie Wetlands manage-
ment
USA S Haygood 1995
Cold Lake Plant siting Canada S Elder 1982
Colstrip Power Plant Air pollution
management





USA S Stewart et al. 1984
Dortmund Waste management Germany I Gremler and Maibaum 1994
Dresden Infrastructure politics Germany S Schmidt-Lerm 2005





USA S Abrams et al. 1995





USA I Szasz and Meuser 1997





USA I Rosener 1983; Delli Priscoli
1988
Gevelsberg Infrastructure politics Germany S Fischer-Ohlemacher and Kör-
ber 1993
Holston River Water management USA C Jaegerman 1983
Homestake County Plant siting USA C Watson and Danielson 1983;
Kartez and Bowman 1993
Hudson River Settle-
ment
Water management USA S Talbot 1984




Air pollution politics USA C Mangerich and Luton 1995
Interstate 90 Infrastructure politics USA S Talbot 1984




Waste management USA I Vatter 1998
Konrad Waste management Germany I Müller-Erwig 2000
Monongahela Forest Worest management USA S Steelman 1996, 2001; Steel-
man and Ascher 1997
Münchehagen Waste management Germany I Müller-Erwig 1995; Striegnitz
1997
Pig's Eye Water management USA C Nelson 1990a
Portage Island Natural resources
management
USA C Talbot 1984
Promised Land Natural resources
management
USA S Purdy and Gray 1994
Quincy Library Forest management USA S Duane 1997
Sand Lake Quiet Area Water management USA C Nelson 1990b
San Juan Forest Forest management USA S Tableman 1990
Snoqualmie Flood
Control
Water management USA C Mazmanian 1979
Swan Lake Water management USA C Talbot 1984
Texas Copper Com-
pany
Plant siting USA C Kartez and Bowman 1993
Tonascet Forest management USA S Geisler et al. 1994
Umatilla Basin Water management USA C Neuman 1996
Upper Narragansett
Bay
Water management USA I Burroughs 1999













Wildlife management USA S Todd 2002
